![]() Ukraine’s central position made Russia have to factor in the possibility of Ukrainian troops attacking in either direction. This gave Ukraine the ability to fix Russian forces along one front while attacking on another. While Ukraine was building up forces in Kherson in the south and using rocket artillery, sabotage and unconventional warfare to attack infrastructure to isolate Russian troops, it also maintained a large armored force in the east. These Russian forces collectively outnumbered Ukraine’s army and possessed greater numbers of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and attack aircraft. In the recent counteroffensive, Ukraine used a central position to confront two concentrations of Russian forces, one in the east around the city of Kharkiv and the Donbas region – which includes portions of Donetsk and Luhansk – and a second in the south along the Dnieper River and Kherson. ![]() This allowed the French leader to concentrate his forces in one location, even when they were outnumbered overall. They employed a variant of the 19th-century military concept of “ central position.” This concept is associated with Napoleon, who when confronted with two armies, positioned his forces between them to split the enemy. Ukraine’s military planners used old concepts optimized for a new era in designing its counteroffensive. Yet, Ukrainians have shown the world that a globally connected information environment does not mean the art of deception is dead. ![]() This flood of information makes hiding large military formations increasingly difficult, if not impossible. Modern war takes place during an open-source intelligence revolution in which commercial satellite photos and a constant stream of social media facts and fiction bombard politicians, soldiers and citizens. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |